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ceived and examined. You ask for 'criticisms.' No, I am inclined to believe that quite so much vitally interesting American history was never before presented in so condense a form. The whole make-up is admirable. You may think I exaggerate, but the suggestion you speak of is this,—as an old scholar in the half-digested records of our nation,—there is not a historical library, nor a student digging into our foundations that ought not to obtain a copy of this book of ready reference."

We would not exaggerate the history of our American Union as an object-lesson for the divergent and war-torn nations of the world. The analogy between the thirteen free, sovereign, and independent States of America in 1787, with their propinquities and common interests on the one hand, and the diversities between nations of today, many of them far remote, on the other, is not a complete and perfect analogy. But the difference is only a difference in degree. If we compare the problems discussed and passed upon in Philadelphia in 1787 to problems in arithmetic, then the problems between America and Russia, France and Germany, Japan and China, are problems simply of higher mathematics. The principles involved, the axioms upon which they rest, are the same.

We grant that the solution of international problems is not a matter of organization alone; that it is a matter of sentiment also. But organization and sentiment are inseparable and reciprocal. Tying our States together into a federal Union helped the creation of a united sentiment, but the growth of a united sentiment was a prerequisite of the permanent success of our Union. In the first years under our Constitution, political parties were State parties—Republican and Constitutional parties in Pennsylvania, Schuyler and Clinton and Livingston factions in New York, etc.—and the realignment of all these parties was a long political step toward a real Union. But the Union, because of common interests, sentiments and ideals, became a Union not only in a political sense, but a Union of interests, sentiments, and ideals.

True, Hungarians and Rumanians do not feel toward each other as do Jerseyites and New Yorkers. They of eastern Europe rather have a penchant for cutting each other's throats, instead of contenting themselves with rivalries, theater-jokes, and occasional bad language. True, federal organization is not in and of itself a panacea. Greek federal organization did not prevent the Athenians from spearing the Corinthians. Indeed, at the time it seemed to require the iron hand of Rome to straighten out the anarchy in Hellas. But if Greece went to pieces because of too much freedom, Rome in turn broke up for the want of it.

Analogies are never complete, but the outstanding fact is that America has been an experiment in the na-

ture of a Union of States. Peace is now maintained between the States. The experiment has been tried long enough to make us hopeful that that peace will continue. In any event, the United States of America constitutes the one outstanding successful Union of States which has endured for over a century.

If only the peacemakers of Paris in 1918-19 had permitted themselves to dwell for a few moments upon the lessons learned and taught at Philadelphia in 1787, there would not now be a torn and bleeding Europe all but hopeless, all but destroyed.

THE GENOA CONFERENCE

THE CONFERENCE of European nations met at Genoa Monday, April 10. From what we are able to learn, Lloyd-George combines in himself the forces represented by both Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes at the Washington Conference. If the British Prime Minister is playing politics, he is playing high politics, and, withal, so far successful. With the conference as his chief proposal, he met with the approval of his government. If his motive be wholly political, it cannot be wholly condemned for that reason. Political motives are not necessarily criminal. Even if he were thinking only of British trade, an enlightened self-interest will make it necessary for him to promote means for the reconstruction of the other European powers. Trade depends upon customers, and customers are negligible unless they can buy.

Manifestly, the initiative in the economic restoration of Europe will not be left to the Little Entente, to the Baltic States, or to the Central Powers, if Great Britain, France, and Italy can help it. Lloyd-George and Briand came to a meeting of minds upon this principle when they met in January at Cannes. And yet they saw clearly then what we all see clearly now, that the big fellows must, in an important sense, give in to the little ones. They must aid. And this aid must be concrete and definite. To be precise, it must consist of long-term credits plus confidence. Of course, the armies—Russian, French, and Balkan—must be cut to the bone; the budgets must be balanced; the people must be persuaded to work, where they have not already done so; the issuance of fiat money must be stopped. These are A, B, C's of European rehabilitation. But the big thing is to stop quarreling and to help each other.

Manifestly, the work at Genoa will be done by the big States. Already a "Big Four" holds the reins, a group made up of Lloyd-George, Barthou, Schanzer, Jaspar. The disposition will be to omit reference to the Treaty of Versailles, to avoid stepping on the toes of the Reparations Committee, and to handle Russia with discretion.

New quarrels may be started. The political situation is tense. The only goal worth while just now is confidence.

It is a strange melange, Genoa. Mr. Churchill's speech at Northampton is called by the *London Times* "a complete reversal of the attitude which Great Britain has hitherto adopted toward Bolshevism." The Soviets may become partners in the economic reconstruction of Europe. The vote of confidence in Lloyd-George would seem to warrant his approaches to Tchitcherin. It certainly is an interesting political picture—British ministers, representatives of all Europe, in fact, sitting around the table with Bolshevik Terrorists; the Rumanian Diamandy, formerly prisoner of the Bolsheviki, sitting opposite Tchitcherin of the Soviet delegates; Adolph Joffe and the German Chancellor, Rakovsky and Bratiano, Lloyd-George and Maxim Litvinoff, all actively cultivating each other, for the moment at least, with smiling camaraderie.

Business at Genoa has begun. Lloyd-George delivered the opening address. The greatest of all gatherings of European nations is under way. The 1,056 delegates are applying their minds to restoring the shattered prosperity of Europe. Their program is based upon principles agreed to at Cannes. These principles, briefly summarized by the British Prime Minister, are: "First, when a country enters into contractual obligations with another country or its nationals for value received, that contract cannot be repudiated whenever the country changes its government, without returning value. The second is that no country can wage war on the institutions of another. The third is that one nation shall not engage in aggressive operation against the territory of another. The fourth is that the nationals of one country shall be entitled to impartial justice in the courts of another." These were the conditions laid down at Cannes. They were incorporated in the invitation to the Genoa Conference. They are avowed as the basis of the work at Genoa. Lloyd-George is right: "If any people reject these elementary conditions of civilized intercourse between nations, they cannot be expected to be received into the comity of nations."

From the limited reports at hand it is impossible to get the Genoa picture clearly before us. But the logic of the situation leads all right-thinking men to hope that the delegates are aware of the one outstanding European need, namely, peace. The questions of exchange, credits, and transportation will be discussed to the advantage of Europe. But, judging from past conferences in general and from the Washington Conference in particular, the most important outcome of the work in Genoa will be measured in terms of finer feeling and of a more generous neighborliness. Hunger alone demands this friendlier attitude. The snarling and the biting

does nothing but continue the ills they of Europe long to escape.

Of course, America is interested in the Genoa Conference. It can say nothing about it officially, but every one, from the President down, knows the importance of that gathering. Every intelligent American knows that the Genoa Conference is a natural step following the meetings in Washington, a step toward the world conference that is sure to follow. Mr. Lloyd-George is convinced that if they can set their political house in order in Europe America will not merely come in, but come in gladly. He said: "A distinguished citizen of this city once upon a time discovered America; and, as Genoa in the past discovered America to Europe, I am hopeful that Genoa once more will render another immortal service to humanity by rediscovering Europe to America." The stern fact here seems to be that the United States will not cancel Europe's debt nor open her vaults without guarantees of security. Genoa will discover Europe to America if only the conference will show Europe capable of sensing and admitting her foolishness.

It is not reasonable to expect that the League of Nations will play any considerable part at Genoa. Mr. Lloyd-George has suggested that the principle of the covenant will have to be extended to Russia, to the end that she shall undertake not to attack her neighbors, and that her neighbors must undertake a corresponding obligation not to attack Russia. But he added, "The only difference would be that I do not think we could undertake the responsibility we have under clause 10 of the League of Nations of defending her frontiers if they are attacked." Such a statement, it seems to us, is a repudiation of the League. But the very Genoa Conference is itself a more pointed repudiation. This is to the credit side of the conference, for, as in the case of the Washington Conference, the way may be left open for those normal, healing, international processes peculiar only to voluntary gatherings of States seeking a peace of justice under laws voluntarily set up to be voluntarily obeyed.

THE PLOT THICKENS

CAN EUROPE attend to her own business? That is the question before the world. There are evidences that the attempt to straighten out her affairs by means of a conference at Genoa is to end in a mess. At the moment there appear to be three ententes tugging disrespectfully at each other's hair—the Russo-German bloc, the big powers with their satellites, and certain of the neutrals.

The Germans and the Russians broke into the picture Easter Sunday with a treaty calculated to establish a full reciprocity between them. It is proposed to resume